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The Influence of James B. Thayer
upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis,
and Frankfurter
Wallace Mendelson*
James Bradley Thayer was one of the major figures in American
constitutional law if only because of his influence upon Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter (to say nothing of Learned and Augustus
Hand). Now almost forgotten, Thayer, along with Christopher Columbus Langdell, John Chipman Gray, and James Barr Ames, was
one of the giants at the Harvard Law School during its "golden age"
at the close of the nineteenth century.' His legal career began only
after serious flirtation with divinity and the Greek and Latin classics.2 That his interest in such matters was never suppressed en-

tirely is evident in hisA Western Journey with Mr. Emerson (1884).3
Yet Thayer was not a cloistered scholar. Graduated from Harvard
Law School in 1856, he became a leading practitioner at the Boston
bar before becoming Royall Professor of Law at Harvard in 1874,
having previously turned down a Harvard professorship in English.
His tongue and pen, moreover, were always ready to promote such
"good causes" as tariff reform, better treatment of Indians, and
reform in the granting of corporate charters.4 His great study, A
PreliminaryTreatise on Evidence at the Common Law, published
in 1898, led in due course to Wigmore's masterpiece-Wigmore having been one of his students. Thayer also compiled the first casebook
on American constitutional law, Cases on Constitutional Law, in
1895. Apart from his technical work, he is now known-by the few
who remember-for his insistence upon judicial respect for the
political branches of government. In his classic essay, "The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, " ' he in* Professor of Government, University of Texas. B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1933;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1936; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1940.
1. See THE HAv~AR LAw SCHOOL 1817-1917, at 30-33 (1917); Beale, Langdell, Gray,
Thayer and Ames-Their Contribution to the Study and Teaching of Law, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 385, 390 (1931); James Bradley Thayer, 15 HARv. L. REv. 599 (1902); The Late James
Bradley Thayer, 36 Am.L. Rav. 248 (1902).
2. See Hall, James Bradley Thayer, in 8 GRAT AMCAN LAWYERS 345, 347, 350, 37375 (W. Lewis ed. 1909).

3. The volume is the chronicle of Thayer's journey with the aged essayist Ralph Waldo
Emerson, his wife's cousin.
4. See Hall, supra note 2, at 379.
5. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HAuv. L. Ray. 129 (1893).
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sisted that judicial review is strictly judicial and thus quite different
from the policy-making functions of the executive and legislative
branches. In performing their duties, he said, judges must take care
not to intrude upon the domain of the other branches of government. Full and free play must be permitted to "that wide margin
of considerations which address themselves only to the practical
judgment of a legislative body."6 Thus for Thayer, legislation could
be held unconstitutional only "when those who have the right to
make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational question."'7 Above
all, Thayer believed, the Constitution, as Chief Justice Marshall
had observed, is not a tightly drawn legal document like a title deed
to be technically construed; it is rather a matter of "great outlines"
broadly drawn for an unknowable future.8 Often men of reason may
differ about its meaning and application; in short, the written Constitution offers a wide range for legislative discretion and choice.
The judicial veto, then, is to be exercised only in cases that leave
no room for reasonable doubt.
This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex everunfolding
exigencies of government, much which will seem unconstitutional to one man,
or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution
often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice
and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the
legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and
that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.'
6. Id. at 135.
7. Id. at 144.
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 407 (1819).

9. Thayer, supra note 5, at 144. When such a "range of choice and judgment" is available to the legislature, the choice is, in Thayer's view, "a part of that mass of legislative
functions which belong to it and not to the court." Thayer, Contitutionalityof Legislation:
The Precise Question for a Court, 38 THE NATION 314, 314-15 (1884). Thayer did not extend
the same deference to the exercise of state legislative power vis-A-vis congressional authority:
[w]hen [in this context] the question is whether State action be or be not conformable
to the paramount constitution, the supreme law of the land, we have a different matter
in hand. Fundamentally, it involves the allotment of power between the two governments,-where the line is to be drawn. True, the judiciary is still debating whether a
legislature has transgressed its limit; but the departments are not co-ordinate, and the
limit is at a different point. The judiciary now speaks as representing a paramount
constitution and government, whose duty it is, in all its departments, to allow to that
constitution nothing less than its just and true interpretation; and having fixed this, to
guard it against any inroads from without.
Thayer, supra note 5, at 154-55 (emphasis supplied). In Thayer's view, however, when Congress has exercised its power to regulate a particular aspect of interstate commerce and when
the state also has exercised its regulatory power in the same area,
it would appear to be the office of the Federal legislature, and not of the Federal courts,
to supervise and moderate the action of the local legislatures, where it touches these
parts of commerce.
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Thayer traced these views far back in American history, finding, for
example, that as early as 1811 the chief justice of Pennsylvania had
concluded:
For weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle in constitutional
construction by the Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and
every other court of reputation in the United States, that an Act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the constitution is so
manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.'0

This view of the judicial function, of course, was the bedrock
upon which Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter built their judicial
philosophies. Holmes had been Thayer's young friend and colleague
on the Harvard faculty. Later, referring to Thayer's famous essay,
Holmes wrote:
I agree with it heartily and it makes explicit the point of view from which
implicitly I have approached the constitutional questions upon which I have
differed from some of the other judges."

The young Brandeis had studied constitutional law under Thayer;
thereafter they became close personal friends. 2 Much later Frankfurter referred to Thayer as "the great master of constitutional law"
and in a lecture at the Harvard Law School observed that
[o]ne brought up in the traditions of James Bradley Thayer, echoes of whom
were still resounding in this very building in my student days, is committed
to Thayer's statesmanlike conception of the limits within which the
Supreme
1 3
Court should move, and I shall try to be loyal to his admonition.
[If I were to name one piece of writing on American Constitutional Law
. . . I would pick [Thayer's once famous essay] . . .[b]ecause . . . it's the
... [Tihe question whether or not a given subject admits of only one uniform
system or plan of regulation is primarily a [national] legislative question, not a judicial
one. For it involves a consideration of what, on practical grounds, is expedient, or
possible, or desirable ....
J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 36 n.1 (1927). When Congress has not exercised its power, the
question whether the subject of the state regulation requires uniformity "is for Congress, and
the State regulation 'must stand until Congress shall see fit to alter it,'" Id.; see Gabin,
Judicial Review, James Bradley Thayer, and the "Reasonable Doubt" Test, 3 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 961, 977-83 (1976).

10. Thayer, supra note 5, at 140. The case to which Thayer made reference is Commonwealth ex rel. O'Hara v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (Pa. 1811).
11. Quoted in Mark De Wolfe Howe, Introduction, in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, & FEuX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL, at xi (1967).
12. FELIx FRANKFURTR ON THE SUPREME COURT 252 (P. Kurland ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as FRANKFURTER ON ThE SUPaEM CouRT]; see Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice
Goldmark (Oct. 13, 1890), reprinted in 1 LErras OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 92-93 (M. Urofsky &

D. Levy eds. 1971); Letter from James B. Thayer to Louis D. Brandeis (1878), reprintedin
A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 43 (1946). When Thayer went abroad in 1882-1883,

the young Brandeis assumed his former professor's course in evidence at Thayer's request.
13. FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME CouRr, supranote 12, at 542.
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great guide for judges and therefore, the great guide for understanding by nonjudges of what the place of the judiciary is in relation to constitutional questions. 4

To hold that Thayer's views were fundamental in the work of the
three justices is not to suggest that they stopped where he stopped.
Each of them indeed built upon his insights to develop what may
be called the classic Harvard approach to constitutional adjudication. The Thayer touch is obvious in Holmes and Brandeis dissents
in numerous substantive due process cases. In Coppagev. Kansas,'5
for example, in which the Court invalidated a state statute prohibiting employers from requiring employees to agree not to become or
remain members of labor unions, Holmes observed in dissent:
In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that only by
belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. ... If
that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems
to me that it may be enforced by law. . . .Whether in the long run it is wise
for the workingmen to enact legislation of this sort is not my concern, but I
am strongly of [the] opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States to prevent it .... 11

Similar views appear in Holmes' dissent in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,7 in which the Court struck down a congressional minimum wage statute for women in the District of Columbia:
The criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be
for the public good. We certainly cannot . . . deny that a reasonable man

reasonably might have that belief..
[Therefore,] I am of the opinion that the statute is valid. . . .'

Holmes' dissent from the Court's invalidation in Bartels v. Iowa,,
of a state statute requiring the use of English as the medium of
instruction in the public schools provides another example of
Thayer's teaching:
I think I appreciate the objection to the law but it appears to me to present a
question upon which men reasonably might differ and therefore I am unable
to say that the Constitution of the United States prevents the experiment
being tried."

In'Brandeis' opinions Thayerism was generally fleshed out by
extended "real life" analysis of the circumstances that had produced the challenged legislation, by the history of similar measures
14.
15.
16.

H.

17.
18.
19.
20.

261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 570-71.
262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting in part).
Id.

PHILLIPS, FEux FRANKFURTER REMINIScES 299-300 (1960).
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
Id. at 26-27.
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in other jurisdictions, and by resumes of relevant statistical and
other studies-all this to establish the reasonableness of the legislation in question.2 ' Brandeis had perfected this innovating emphasis
upon the "facts" in his highly successful Brandeis Brief in Muller
v. Oregon. Prior thereto,
[siocial legislation was supported before the courts largely in vacuo-as an
abstract dialectic between "liberty" and "police power," unrelated to the
world of trusts and unions, of large-scale industry and all its implications. In
the [Brandeis approach] the facts of modern industry which provoke regulatory legislation were, for the first time, adequately marshalled before the
Court. It marks an epoch ....

The Brandeis technique was more studied than Holmes'. Indeed
Holmes reported to his friend Pollock that his colleague had chided
him for indifference to extensive factual research:
Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with reference to
my summer occupations. He said you talk about improving your mind, you
only exercise it on the subjects with which you are familiar. Why don't you
try something new, study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries
in Massachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently you can go to
Lawrence and get a human notion of how it really is. I hate facts. I always
say the chief end of man is to form general propositions-adding that no
general proposition is worth a damn. Of course a general proposition is simply
a string for the facts and I have little doubt that it would be good for my
immortal soul to plunge into them, good also for the performance of my duties,
but I shrink from the bore-or rather I hate to give up the chance to read this
and that, that a gentleman should have read before he dies.2 '

In contrast to Brandeis' massively researched opinions, Holmes'
efforts generally were expressed-as from Olympus-in a few epigrammatic sallies resting heavily upon Thayer and upon a deepseated skepticism that led him to question even the foundations of
his own most basic beliefs.
When I say that a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help believing it. I
am stating an experience as to which there is no choice. But as there are many
things that I cannot help doing that the universe can, I do not venture to
assume that my inabilities in the way of thought are inabilities of the universe.
I therefore define the truth as the system of my limitations, and leave absolute
truth for those who are better equipped ...
. . .To have doubted one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized
man.Y
21. See, e.g., the Brandeis opinions in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
280 (1932); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924); and Adams v. Tanner,
244 U.S. 590, 597 (1917).
22. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
23. FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 12, at 251-52.
24. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919), reprinted in 2
HoLMES-PoLLOCK LErraRs 13 (M. Howe ed. 1961).
25. Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1915).
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I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority vote of that nation
that could lick all others. . . . I think that the statement was correct in so far
as it implied that our test of truth is a reference to either a present or an
imagined future majority in favor of our view. If, as I have suggested elsewhere,
the truth may be defined as the system of my (intellectual) limitations, what
gives it objectivity is the fact that I find my fellow man to a greater or less
6
extent (never wholly) subject to the same Can't Helps."
I see no meaning in the rights of man except what the crowd will fight for.

In sharp contrast, Brandeis was a hopeful progressive. Indeed
he had been a major leader of the Progressive Movement." His
elaborate judicial opinions upholding regulations of business often
must have been labors of love. Yet, he like Holmes was quite capable of vigorous judicial support for economic measures that he privately disliked. This is obvious, for example, in his dissent in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,2 perhaps Brandeis' most brilliant statement of the principle of judicial restraint. There he makes quite
clear his own distaste for the measure in question, a state statute
prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or distribution of ice without a
license:
The objections to the proposal are obvious and grave. The remedy might bring
evils worse than the present disease. The obstacles to success seem insuperable. The economic and social sciences are largely uncharted seas. We have
been none too successful in the modest essays in economic control already
entered upon. The new proposal involves a vast extension of the area of control.
Merely to acquire the knowledge essential as a basis for the exercise of this
multitude of judgments would be a formidable task; and each of the thousands
of these judgments would call for some measure of prophecy. Even more serious are the obstacles to success inherent in the demands which execution of
the project would make upon human intelligence and upon the character of
men. Man is weak and his judgment is at best fallible.
Yet the advances in the exact sciences and the achievements in invention
remind us that the seemingly impossible sometimes happens. 0

In such cases, then, Brandeis, the inspired Progressive, and Holmes,
the thorough-going skeptic, found common ground in Thayer's mandate of hospitality for legislative experimentation. As Brandeis observed in various ways over and over again:
The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest the value
of the process of trial and error. In large measure, these advances have been
due to experimentation. . . . There must be power in the States and the
Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and in26. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40, 40 (1918).
27. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (July 28, 1916), reprinted in 1
HOLMEs-LAsKi LETTERS 8 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
28. See MASON, supra note 12, at 99-441.
29. 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 309-10.
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stitutions to meet changing social and economic needs ...
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike
down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the
measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this,
because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise
of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices
into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold. 31

Holmes' response reveals a striking difference between the two jurists; it also suggests that although Holmes was a skeptic, he was
not a cynic:
Generally speaking, I agree with you in liking to see social experiments tried
but I do so without enthusiasm because I believe it is merely shifting the
pressure and 32that so long as we have free propagation Malthus is right in his
general view.

It is noteworthy that in Thayer's day no significant free speech
or press litigation had reached the Supreme Court. Thus he had no
empirical grounds for considering a judge's role in that context.
Holmes and Brandeis did. Their tacit conclusion was that for purposes of the first amendment a lenient rational basis test was inadequate. Accordingly, they devised the stricter "clear and present
danger" test for first amendment utterance cases, 33 an approach
calculated to give legislatures less leeway than in other contexts.
Speaking of Holmes, the then Professor Frankfurter provided for the
first time an explicit rationale for this double standard:
The Justice deferred so abundantly to legislative judgment on economic
policy because he was profoundly aware of the extent to which social arrangements are conditioned by time and circumstances, and of how fragile, in scientific proof, is the ultimate validity of a particular economic adjustment. He
knew that there was no authoritative fund of social wisdom to be drawn upon
for answers to the perplexities which vast new material resources had brought.
And so he was hesitant to oppose his own opinion to the economic views of the
legislature. But history had also taught him that, since social development is
a process of trial and error, the fullest possible opportunity for the free play
of the human mind was an indispensable prerequisite. Since the history of
civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error which once
31. Id. at 310-11.
32. Quoted in A. BIcKEL, THE UNPUBUSHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSIIcE BRANDEIS 221
(1957).
33. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
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held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other truths,
the liberty of man to search for truth was of a different order than some
economic dogma defined as a sacred right because the temporal nature of its
origin had been forgotten. And without freedom of expression, liberty of
thought is a mockery. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile to
the endeavor or under dangers which only heroes hazard.
Naturally, therefore, Mr. Justice Holmes attributed very different legal
significance to those liberties of the individual which history has attested as
the indispensable conditions of a free society from that which he attached to
liberties which derived merely from shifting economic arrangements."

Another major supplement to Thayer's reasonable doubt principle was Brandeis' emphasis upon avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions by strict adherence to jurisdictional limitations
such as those embodied in the standing, ripeness, mootness, and
political question doctrines. This tactic, stressing what Bickel called
the "passive virtues," 35 found classic expression in Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA. 36 Concluding that the plaintiff
in Ashwander had not sustained any past or potential injury and
therefore had no standing, Brandeis reminded his colleagues that
The Court has frequently called attention to the "great gravity and delicacy" of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress; and
has restricted exercise of this function by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction
of federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies; and that they
have no power to give advisory opinions ...
The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.Y

He proceeded to "codify" at some length the rules in question. As
Brandeis put it off the bench, "[tihe most important thing we do
is not doing. ' 38 The thought, of course, was that the fewer social
issues preempted by courts, the greater the latitude for legislative
experimentation-for progress by a pragmatic system of trial and
error. This plainly is an extension of Thayerism.
It was the fate of Holmes and Brandeis to sit with activist,
conservative colleagues in an era of relatively progressive legislation. In this special setting, Thayer's principle of judicial restraint
generally led to liberal results. Thus Holmes and Brandeis were
praised (or criticized) for liberalism. The fact is that, whatever the
tenor of his decisions, Holmes was an old-fashioned, aristocratic
34.

35.
PouTIcs
36.
37.
38.

F.

FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT

See A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH:
111-98 (1962).
297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936).
Id. at 345-46 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
BICKEL, supra note 35, at 17.

50-51 (1938).

THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
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social Darwinian-although for him Darwinism was an explanation,
not an excuse. Moreover, his deep-dyed skepticism put him far
above mundane struggles and partisanship. All his life Holmes held
to the survivial of the competent:
I don't disguise my belief that the Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence [nor] my disbelief that the Interstate
Commerce Commission is a fit body to be entrusted with rate-making ....
However I am so sceptical as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness
of laws that I have no practical criticism [criterion] except what the crowd
wants. Personally I bet that the crowd if it knew more wouldn't want what it
does-but that is immaterial. 3'
The social reformers of today seem to me so far to forget that we no more can
get something for nothing by legislation than we can by mechanics as to be
satisfied if the bill to be paid for their improvements is not presented in a lump
sum. Interstitial detriments that may far outweigh the benefit promised are
not bothered about. Probably I am too skeptical as to our ability to do more
than shift disagreeable burdens from the shoulders of the stronger to those of
the weaker. . . .I believe that the wholesale social regeneration which so
many now seem to expect . . . cannot be affected appreciably by tinkering

with the institution of property, but only by taking in hand life and trying to
build a race. 0
Malthus pleased me immensely-and left me sad. A hundred years ago
he busted fallacies that politicians and labor leaders still live on."

Holmes' dear friends Brandeis and Frankfurter in private life
were "social reformers" who supported the very "fallacies"-wage
and hour laws, for example-that in Holmes' view Malthus had
"busted. 4 2 Professor Frankfurter had a hand in virtually every
major liberal effort of the day. He was a founder of the American
Civil Liberties Union and of the New Republic, a bible of liberalism
in the 1920's and 1930's. He was counsel for the NAACP long before
39. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 25, 1910), reprinted in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LErrES, supra note 24, at 163.
40. Holmes, supra note 25, at 2-3. Holmes expanded upon this theme in his opinion for
the Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in which the Court upheld a state statute
providing for the sterilization of inmates afflicted with hereditary insanity or imbecility:
In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific findings of the
Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if
they exist they justify the result.... It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id. at 207.
41. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1914), reprinted in 2
HOLMES-PoLLOCK LEmRs, supra note 24, at 219.
42. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER, The Eight-HourDay, in LAW AND POLIICS: OCCASIONAL
PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1918, at 203 (A. MacLeish & E. Prichard eds. 1939); THE
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTIcE BRANDEIS (A. Lief ed. 1930).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:71

that was fashionable and for the National Consumers' League as
well. He fought the good fight for Tom Mooney," for the Bisbee
deportees,44 for the victims of the Palmer Raids of 1920, 15 and for
Sacco and Vanzetti" and played a (perhaps the) primary role in
abolishing the labor injunction. 7 Frankfurter, of course, also was a
major contributor to the New Deal. 8 Not only did he help found the
New Republic, he wrote for it repeatedly until his appointment to
the Supreme Court. One mentions this by way of emphasizing the
off-the-bench liberalism of Frankfurter and the conservatism of
Holmes. The latter, writing to Pollock, mentions the enchanting
spring-"the air full of the smell of box and roses and . . .the

yelling of birds," and then adds, "Really if a glance at the New
Republic had not thrown the customary gloom over life it would
seem fair once more."4 Conversely, a brief passage in Frankfurter's
highly eulogistic biography of Holmes reveals a sharp difference
between the two on matters economic: Justice Holmes, Frankfurter
wrote, "came dangerously close to believing in the simplicities of the
wage-fund theory.

'5

If one accepts and slightly amends Arthur Sutherland's definition of a liberal as the sort of person who enjoyed the New Republic
in the 1920's and 1930's, obviously Frankfurter, unlike Holmes, was
a thoroughgoing liberal in his personal life. 5' His fate, however, was
to sit on the Court with a number of liberal activists in an era when
legislation was often quite illiberal. In that context the ThayerHolmes-Brandeis principle of judicial restraint often led to less than
liberal results. Accordingly, as a judge, Frankfurter was widely criticized-erroneously, of course-for conservatism, just as Holmes,
operating in a different age and context, was widely praisederroneously, of course-for liberalism. The point is that in their
view-and in Brandeis' view-Thayer's conception of the relative
roles of courts and legislatures was a principle for all seasons, not
a tool to be used or ignored in the service of a judge's private
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See L. BAKER, FELiX FRANKFURTER 68-73 (1969).

See id. at 66-68, 73.
See id. at 92-96.
See id. at 117-30.
See id. at 132-35.
See id. at 149, 153-79; PmLUPS, supra note 14, at 235-50; ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 93-442 (M. Freedman ed. 1968).
49. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919), reprinted in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 24, at 14.
50. FRANKFURTER, supra note 34, at 44. Frankfurter's comment is in reference to Holmes'
opinion in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (1900).
51. A. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERIcA 470 (1965).
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preferences, which Holmes called his "Can't Helps." This was the
great lesson that Frankfurter learned from Holmes.
We have already seen that Frankfurter had the highest regard
for Thayer. He also was a close friend of both Holmes and Brandeis
for many years, long before he went to the Supreme Court. His
numerous laudatory essays on each of them indicate his discipleship.5" If respect for legislative experimentation as a tool for social
progress characterized the work of Brandeis and skepticism the
work of Holmes, dedication to democracy was the major theme of
Frankfurter's jurisprudence. Perhaps only an immigrant, only one
who had lived his first years under an emperor, could have been so
dedicated to government by the people and to the diffusion of
power. His judicial and other writings are filled with allusions to
judicial review as a "limitation on popular government" and thus
an "undemocratic aspect" of our system. He recognized, however,
that "[o]ur right to pass on the validity of legislation is now too
much part of our constitutional system to be brought into question."5 3 Yet because this right is "inherently oligarchic" and practically uncontrollable and because it prevents "the full play of the
democratic process, '5 4 it is "vital that [this] power of the nondemocratic organ of our Government be exercised with rigorous selfrestraint."5 For Frankfurter, the abuses of the "nine old men" were
not ancient history. Nor could he pretend that activism on the left
was any less "oligarchic" or any less an impediment to popular
government than activism on the right. Accordingly, with Holmes
and Brandeis he was deeply indebted to Thayer's rule of reasonable
doubt-as is obvious, for example, in his cri de coeur in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,56 the so-called second
Flag Salute Case. There Frankfurter pointed out in dissent that on
five previous occasions the Court had found no constitutional infirmity in a mandatory flag salute and that every one of the thirteen
justices involved-including such heroic figures as Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo, Black, and Douglas-had so voted on one or more occasions. Indeed, of the forty-five votes cast in those five cases, fortyfour had found the challenged measure to be within the ambit of
52.

Several of Frankfurter's essays on Holmes and Brandeis are collected in

FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 12.

53. American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 556-57 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
54. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,650 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
55. 335 U.S. at 555 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
56. 319 U.S. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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democratic self-government. In view of this history, Frankfurter

thought it clear that legislators could not be deemed unreasonable
in enacting what thirteen justices had found to be within a state's
constitutional authority.
Only if there be no doubt that any reasonable mind could entertain can we
deny to the states the right to resolve doubts their way and not ours.
I think I appreciate fully the objections to the law before us. But to
deny that it presents a question upon which men might reasonably differ
appears to me to be intolerance. And since men may so reasonably differ, I
deem it beyond my constitutional power to assert my view of the wisdom of
this law against the view of the State ....51

This obviously is pure Thayerism. On the same occasion, Frankfurter again expressed-as in his eulogy to Holmes quoted
above-his dedication to the special Holmes-Brandeis concern for
free speech and press:
All channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents. Had we before us any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon
such free expression, I should not lag behind any member of this Court in
striking down such an invasion of the right to freedom of thought and freedom
of speech protected by the Constitution. 8
57. Id. at 661-62, 666-67.
58. Id. at 664. Frankfurter later observed again that such freedoms "come to this Court
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely
from shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Here, too, Frankfurter objected to what he deemed his colleagues' doctrinaire,
perverting use of the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger test.
If in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), Mr. Justice Frankfurter was not very
respectful of the discourse there in issue, surely the reason was that Dennis and his compan.
ions had spoken in secret and underground, ie. conspiratorially. Their views had not been
offered for what Holmes and Brandeis called "public discussion" as part of the "free trade
in ideas" in the "competition of the market" where the public is offered exposure to conflicting views so that it can choose intelligently among them. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Recall Milton's famous line in Areopagitica:
"[W]ho ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" J. MILTON,
Areopagitica, in 2 THE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 96 (J. St. John ed. 1900) (emphasis
supplied). Mill's On Liberty rests on what he called "the morality of public discussion." J.
MILL, ON LIBERTY 99 (1887). Jefferson put it briefly: truth is "the proper and sufficient
antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition
[e.g., secrecy] disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate .... " 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis supplied). Benjamin Franklin
has it thus: "[Wihen Men differ in Opinion, both Sides ought equally to have the Advantage
of being heard by the Publick .... B. FRANKLIN, An Apology for Printers (1731), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 194-95 (L. Labaree ed. 1959). In Chafee's view, "the fundamental policy of the First Amendment [is] the open discussion of public affairs." Z. CHAFEE,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 30 (1920) (emphasis supplied). As Meiklejohn put it:
What, then, does the First Amendment forbid? Here again the town meeting suggests
an answer. That meeting is called to discuss and, on the basis of such discussion, to
decide matters of public policy. . . .The voters, therefore, must be made as wise as
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So, too, Frankfurter might well have gone even further than
Brandeis in strict adherence to jurisdictional limitations, the
"passive virtues," as devices for avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. 9 Indeed Frankfurter, as professor of federal jurisdiction at Harvard, may have led Brandeis to this ploy initially. In
any event, Brandeis no doubt discussed such matters with his professorial friend and former associate in litigation, who was then the
nation's leading academic specialist in the problems of federal court
jurisdiction.
Finally, just as Holmes and Brandeis added something to
Thayerism, so did Frankfurter in the McNabb-Mallory doctrine, 0
which permits the Court to avoid constitutional judgment by turning decisions upon its supervisory control over the lower federal
courts. Such decisions, because they do not rest upon the Constitution, are subject to congressional control. They thus escape the antidemocratic element that Frankfurter found in constitutional review.
Free of this element, the Justice had no difficulty in reaching a
highly liberal and thus personally gratifying result in McNabb and
in Mallory. Finally, in his opinion for the Court in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,"1 Frankfurter launched the modern history
of judicially developed federal district court abstention in cases in
which state law may be dispositive 2-another device for avoiding
unnecessary constitutional adjudication.
If Holmes' methodological forte was skepticism (and the
sprightly epigram) and if Brandeis specialized in mining the facts,
Frankfurter's specialty was precedent. What these three approaches
have in common is plain: each provides a considerable barrier
against subjectivity in the judicial process. To that end, in crucial
possible. . . . And this, in turn, requires that. . . all facts and interests relevant to the
problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting.
. .[[The fifth amendment's] limited guarantee of the freedom . . . to speak is
radically different in intent from the unlimited guarantee of the freedom of public
discussion, which is given by the First Amendment.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELAiON TO SELF-GovERNENT 24-25, 39 (1948) (emphasis supplied). Thus all of these great founts of our free-speech ideal seem to have anticipated
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's stand in Dennis; namely, that freedom of speech means open,
public discussion, not underground activity designed to achieve its goals by circumventing,
rather than winning, community consent.
59. For pertinent examples, see the long line of his opinions from Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), through Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
60. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
61. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
62. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 170 (1963).
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case after case Frankfurter's opinions carefully analyze all relevant
decisions in search of what Holmes called an "external standard"
for judgment. The scholarly effort that went into Frankfurter's opinions, for example, in Harris v. United States,63 Wolfe v. Colorado,4
5 is astoundCulombe v. Connecticut,5 and the Steel Seizure Case"
ing. Such painstaking toil, like that of Brandeis," is the unspoken
answer to a freewheeling justice who not long ago insisted that the
Court is "vastly underworked."65 How easy the job of activist
judges-new or old-who do not find, but only make, the law! No
great effort, intelligence, or integrity is required to read one's merely
personal preferences into the Constitution; a great deal is required
to keep them out. The point is not that anyone does this perfectly,
but rather that some try and indeed, as in all phases of life, some
are far more capable of objectivity and detachment than others. As
Judge Hand observed,
[W]e know that men do differ widely in this capacity [for detachment]; and
the incredulity which seeks to discredit that knowledge is a part of the crusade
against reason from which we have already so bitterly suffered. We may
deny-and, if we are competent observers, we will deny-that no one can be
aware of the danger [of his bias] and in large measure provide against it."

For sixty years, from 1902 until 1962, at least one and for a time
two of the "Harvard judges" were on the Supreme Court. In all
those years their influence was far out of proportion to their numbers. With the coming of the hysterical 1960's-about the time of
Frankfurter's retirement-almost all that they had stood for vanished. Perhaps not quite all, for no activist, modern or vintage, has
ever admitted in public that he is an activist. Quite to the contrary,
no matter how great the judicial leap, its authors always insist that
it derives from some constitutionally appropriate (if previously invisible) source and that it really is not an innovation anyway. 0 Is
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

331 U.S. 145 (1947).
338 U.s. 25 (1949).
367 U.S. 568 (1961).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Brandeis' draft opinions "went through dozens, sometimes scores, of revisions." P.
127 (1968).
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 178 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
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68.

ing).
69. L. HAND, TIIE SPIRrr OF LIaBRTY 218 (1960).
70. For example, the majority opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966),
proclaims, "We start . . . with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our
jurisprudence ...." See also Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REv. 211.

Need one say that in the Thayer view great policy leaps are for legislative bodies, not
for courts, and that a flexible, living Constitution is one that makes reasonable accommodations to changing social needs as perceived and enacted by legislatures?
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this not lip service to the Thayer tradition?
Since Frankfurter's retirement in 1962, courts have pushed beyond desegregation to integration via busing; they have undertaken
to desegregate even private schools, to reapportion legislatures, to
regulate private employment practices, to supervise municipal
land-use planning, to provide a detailed abortion code, to oversee
and redirect any number of welfare programs, to supervise police
investigations, to outlaw capital punishment, in effect, and then to
reinstate it with limitations, to direct credit policies of banks and
credit card companies, to supervise the supervision of children in
their schools, to monitor environmental quality, and even to manage prison and mental institutions.7 1 Surely all of this (and more)
constitutes a radical transformation of the role of judges in American life. Surely, too, judicial pretension no longer can be justified
on the ground that it is only a negative, a veto, power.
If, then, the Thayer tradition of judicial modesty is outmoded-if judicial aggression is to be the rule in policy matters, as
in the 1930's-some basic issues remain. First, how legitimate is
government by judges? Is anything to be beyond the reach of their
authority? Will anything be left for ultimate resolution by the democratic processes-for what Thayer called "that wide margin of considerations which address themselves only to the practical judgment
of a legislative body"" representing (as courts do not) a wide range
of mundane needs and aspirations? The legislative process, after all,
is a major ingredient of freedom under government.
Legislation is a process slow and cumbersome. It turns out a productlaws-that rarely are liked by everybody, and frequently little liked by anybody ....

[Wihen seen from the shining cliffs of perfection the legislative

process of compromise appears shoddy indeed. But when seen from some
concentration camp of the only alternative way of life, the compromises of
legislation appear but another name for what we call civilization and even
revere as Christian forbearance.73

Let philosophy fret about ideal justice. Politics is our substitute for
civil war in a constant struggle between different conceptions of
good and bad. It is far too wise to gamble for Utopia or nothing-to
be fooled by its own romantic verbiage. Above all, it knows that
none of the numerous clashing social forces is apt to be completely
without both vice and virtue. By give and take, the legislative process seeks not final truth, but an acceptable balance of community
interests. In this view the harmonizing and educational function of
71. lam indebted here to Chayes, The New Judiciary,28 HARV. L. ScH. BuLL.23 (1976).
72. Thayer, supra note 5, at 135.
73.

T. SMITH, THE LaisLAnvE WAY OF LiaFE 91-92 (1940).
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the process itself counts for more than any of its legislative products.
To intrude upon its pragmatic adjustments by judicial fiat is to
frustrate our chief instrument of social peace and political stability.
Second, if the Supreme Court is to be the ultimate policymaking body-without political accountability-how is it to avoid
the corrupting effects of raw power? Can the Court avoid the selfinflicted wounds that have marked other episodes of judicial
imperialism? 74 Can the Court indeed satisfy the expectations it has
already aroused?
A third cluster of questions involves the competence of the
Supreme Court as a legislative body. Can any nine men master the
complexities of every phase of American life which, as the post-1961
cases suggest, is now the Court's province? Are any nine men wise
enough and good enough to wield such power over the lives of
millions? Are courts institutionally equipped for such burdens? 5
Unlike legislatures, they are not representative bodies reflecting a
wide range of social interests. Lacking a professional staff of trained
investigators, they must rely for data almost exclusively upon the
partisan advocates who appear before them. Inadequate or misleading information invites unsound decisions. 7 If courts are to rely
upon social science data as facts, they must recognize that such data
are often tentative at best, subject to varying interpretations, and
questionable on methodological grounds. Moreover, since social science findings and conclusions are likely to change with continuing
research, they may require a system of ongoing policy reviews as new
or better data become available. 7 Is the judiciary capable of performing this function of continuing supervision and adjustment traditionally provided by the legislative and administrative
78
processes?
Finally, what kind of citizens will such a system of judicial
activism produce-a system that trains us to look not to ourselves
74. Consider, for example, the gross abuse of judicial power in the era of rampant
economic activism that culminated in the Court-packing crisis of 1937. See R. MCCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 136-79 (1960). For other examples of judicially self-inflicted
wounds, see L. GRAGLiA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE
SCHOOLS 129-31, 279-81 (1976); F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLCMED WOUND (1970); D. HOROWITZ,
THE COUMRS AND SocIAL PoLacY 171-254 (1977); C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

50 (1928).
75. See Johnson, The Constitutionand the FederalDistrictJudge, 54 TEx. L. REV. 903,

STATES

905 (1976).
76. See HoRowrrz, supra note 74, at 274-84.
77. Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, in THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 104, 11617 (N. Glazer & I. Kristol eds. 1976).
78. See HORowrrz, supra note 74, at 264-66.
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for the solution of our problems, but to the most elite among elites:
nine lawyers governing our lives without political or judicial
accountability? Surely this is neither democracy nor the rule of
law. Such are the problems addressed by and-at least in the minds
of jurists like Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter-resolved by
Thayer's doctrine of judicial restraint.

